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INTRODUCTION 
 
The image of a country is mainly a construction of its popular perception.1 Many 
stereotypes2 are just the consequence of prejudices or single experiences, which have 
been made public and are responsible for the creation of resentment with regard to a 
particular country. Russia. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia 
became Japan’s number one enemy for a possible forthcoming war. This image was 
mainly created and supported by the nationalist circles, led by the Amur society 
(Kokuryūkai),3 which was founded to enforce a war against Russia.  
This society tried to influence Japanese politicians as well as public opinion by 
reporting about Russia and frequently demanding a more aggressive course against 
the tsarist enemy. Russia’s expansive course in East Asia was stigmatized as a threat to 
Japanese imperial aspirations with regard to the Asian mainland, especially for its 
influence in Korea. A war was declared to be suitable, and for the Kokuryūkai’s 
planning a war seemed to be sure. Its leader, Uchida Ryōhei (1873–1937),4 published 
                                                
1 For this topic see Anderson 2006.  
2 For a general introduction see Qeybullayeva 2010. 
3 The works on the Kokuryūkai in Western languages are Jacob 2013 and Jacob 2014. 
4 For a detailed biography of Uchida the before mentioned works of Jacob are recommended. 
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pamphlets and books5 that underlined the anti-Russian ideology of the society and 
helped broaden support for a war against the tsarist empire. 
The following article will outline the history of the Kokuryūkai from 1901 until 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 in order to provide a survey of the 
society and its activities. The society was founded as an offshoot of the Black Ocean 
Society (Genyōsha),6 which was founded in 1881, but it did not have such an explicit 
anti-Russian stance. This paper consequently will also deal with the question of why 
the Kokuryūkai was founded at all in 1901. Was there a special catalyst for the creation 
of a particular society at this point? Alongside with this, the anti-Russian agitation of 
the society shall be taken into consideration to show how the society was trying to 
influence political and popular opinion. Furthermore, how it defined its aims as well as 
its enemy shall be considered. Finally, whether and how the members of the society 
were responsible for creating a negative image of Russia following the years of its 
foundation will be analyzed.  
 
 
THE KOKURYŪKAI (1901–1905) 
 
When American Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858) and his small fleet of 
“Black ships” opened Japan to the West, their actions should have had tremendous 
effects on the Japanese society. The shogun was forced to sign the so-called unequal 
treaties7 with the United States and other Western Great Powers. Now even Russia 
could force the Japanese government to sign a treaty with her, a wish that had been 
denied by Japan for decades (Lensen G. A. 1959). All in all, the opening of Japan had 
political, social, and cultural consequences.8 The shogun finally had to abdicate his 
power and the following Meiji Restoration (See Beasley 1972), starting in 1868, laid the 
groundwork for the rule of the emperor, changed society as a whole by abolishing the 
Confucian based hierarchical division within it, and set the beginning of Japanese 
industrialization, which would Westernize Japan in the following years until the 
1890s.9  
The losers of these events were the samurai,10 who had ruled Japan for centuries 
and now had to face their loss of influence and newfound roles as simple spectators. 
More and more former samurai were unable to integrate themselves into the new 
economic system. In addition, they were unwilling to serve as members of a conscript 
                                                
5 Just two examples of the wide range of publications are Kokuryūkai 1940 and Kokuryūkai 1935/36.  
6 The Genyōsha also published its own history (Genyōsha 1917). 
7 Auslin M. R., 2006, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese 
Diplomacy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. (MA). 
8 For a broad survey of the changes see Jacob 2013. 
9 During the process of Westernization the Japanese government hired several specialist from 
Western countries. See Shimada 1987.  
10 For a survey of the long history of the samurai, see Schwentker 2008. 
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army, fighting side by side with peasants. The consequence was an increasing 
potential for aggression, which finally broke out during the Satsuma Rebellion (See 
Mounsey 1979), led by the famous samurai leader Saigō Takamori (1828–1877) (See 
Ravina 2004), who died in battle and was unable to change the fate of the former 
warrior class. The bushi, as the former samurai called themselves, had to search for new 
ways to make a living. Some went to the Asian mainland where they tried to live as 
rōnin (masterless samurai) and were called continental rōnin (tairiku rōnin).11 Some of 
those who remained in Japan tried to prosecute the fight of Saigō by founding secret 
societies. 
The Genyōsha was one of them. Founded and led by Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–
1944),12 the society assembled mainly bushi, working in secrecy. Their aim was a 
Japanese expansion and a weakening of the government. For this reason, they 
supported not only Pan-Asianist leaders like Kim Ok-gyun (1851–1894), Sun Yat-sen 
(1866–1925), and Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), but were also even involved in the 
attempt to kill foreign minister Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) in 1889, not to 
mention other political plots. The society tried to collect weapons to send a private 
army to Korea. However, this plan had to abandoned, because a similar project – the 
so-called Ôsaka Incident of 1885 – was prevented by the police. Therefore the 
possibility that the government might also find out about the Genyōsha’s intent for a 
private invasion of Korea became too dangerous and the project was canceled. 
A few months before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1894/95) (See 
Paine 2003), the Genyōsha created a guerilla group of 14 members, called “Gallant 
Assistance from Heaven” (Tenyūkyō),13 and sent them to Korea to use the already 
running Donghak Rebellion to create a reason for war between Japan and China. One 
of the group members was Uchida Ryōhei, who was trained in the Genyōsha dōjō and 
was selected for his specialization in explosives. In Korea, the members joined the 
ranks of the Donghak and led sabotage troops against the Korean army. The claim that 
these 14 men were responsible for the outbreak of the war seems to be just a myth, 
which was created by the Genyōsha itself in later years. The rebellion had already been 
successful before the Japanese men went to Korea and the government had pleaded 
with China to provide assistance as consequence of the revolutionary threat, not 
because it feared 14 Japanese men.  
But either way, the war began in full force and Japan won its first major battle in 
Asia, showing that it had become modernized enough to win a war against the 
biggest Asian nation.14 Its Westernization proved to be successful and Japan longed 
                                                
11 For an account dealing with this phenomenon, see Siniawer 2008. 
12 For a biography of Tōyama, see Fujimoto 1967.  
13 The Tenyūkyō was formed of 14 men, who were recruited from the ranks of the Genyōsha but 
from the military as well. 
14 This led to the propaganda of a “Yellow Peril” in Asia in Western countries during the following 
years. 
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for economic and territorial reparations. The peace treaty of Shimonoseki15 dictated 
the conditions of the Japanese victory: 
 
1. China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of 
Korea. […] 
2. China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories […] 
a) The southern portion of the province of Fēngtien […]  
b) The island of Formosa […] 
c) The Pescadores Group […] 
3. The alignment of the frontiers […] shall be subject to verification and demarcation on 
the spot by a Joint Commission of Delimitation […] 
4. China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels 
[…] 
5. The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence 
outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire […] 
 
But Japanese aspirations were not successful in this regard. The other great 
powers, namely France and Germany, led by a Russian initiative, intervened against 
the expansionist ambitions of the Japanese empire. The so-called Triple Intervention 
crushed Japanese dreams of a victorious expansion and Russia became seen as an 
enemy for the next war, because just two years later, in 1897, the Russian government 
leased Port Arthur16 from the Chinese; it was the harbor Japan would have possessed 
following the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
However this was not the only reason why Russia was increasingly perceived as 
dangerous. Between 1899 and 1901, China was shaken by the Boxer Rebellion (See 
Cohen 1997). The increasing influence of Western powers led the Chinese people to 
revolt and a group, called the Boxers, assembled the population against the 
government. Only an international expeditionary force was able to end this rebellion. 
Japan sent the majority of soldiers to the Asian mainland. Russia had been hesitant 
during the main conflict, but in the final period the czarist army intervened and 
occupied the whole territory of Manchuria. While the other great powers protested, 
the Russian government was unwilling to abandon the Manchurian territory again and 
stated that it would only directly negotiate with China. Despite the negotiations, 
Russia did not end its occupation of the southern parts of the territory, which would 
have been under Chinese authority again in 1901. The permanent threat to Korea and 
the Japanese interest there, combined with the Russian unwillingness to withdraw her 
troops from Manchuria, motivated Uchida to found the Kokuryūkai, which focused on 
preparing Japan for a war against Russia.  
 
 
                                                
15 <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm>. 
16 Port Arthur was a harbor at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula and was of the highest 
strategic value. 
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ANTI-RUSSIAN AGITATION 
 
The Triple Intervention and Russian penetration of Manchuria were the culprits that 
led to anti-Russian resentment from Japanese nationalists, especially the members of 
the Genyōsha and Uchida Ryōhei, who had traveled through the tsarist empire before 
and was willing to fight for an end to this policy (Toyama 1980: 78-83). The future 
founder of the Kokuryūkai was not willing to grant the Russians a sphere of influence 
bordered by the Tae-dong River and wanted to drive the border back behind the 
Amur River. He started to think about an extension of the Tenyūkyō, which led to the 
foundation of the Amur Society. In January 1901, the foundation of the new 
organization was discussed and on February 3rd the society was finally founded with 
59 charter members (Brown 1955: 139; Kokuryūkai 1940: 6; Kokuryūkai 1935/36 Vol.1: 
678; Suga 2003: 107-144, especially 120; Takayanagi 2003: 67-105, especially 83). 
Its members were men who were already engaged in the activities of the 
Genyōsha and the Tenyūkyō, but were also right-wing party activists. Tōyama Mitsuru 
remained their ideological leader, who discussed the actions and plans of the 
Kokuryūkai with Uchida, but took action from the background (Sabey 1998:10). 
Despite its connections to the Genyōsha, the society was a single and independent 
organization even if there were striking similarities with regard to their tennō-
centrism, which was strongly favored by both groups. 
The main reason for Kokuryūkai’s existence was the need to prepare for war 
against the tsarist empire in order to save Japanese hegemony in Korea. Uchida, 
financed by Japanese plutocrats (zaibatsu) like Mitsui or Yasuda, longed for a Japanese 
realpolitik that would include expansion on the Asian mainland (Somura1957: 463). 
Shortly after its establishment, the new society opened its own publishing house in 
Tôkyô on March 10, 1901; it was responsible for the publication of the anti-Russian 
Bulletin of the Kokuryūkai (Kokuryūkai Kaihō).17 This journal provided information for all 
those who were interested in Russia. Uchida, who had traversed Russia after the Sino-
Japanese War, was able to describe the situation in the tsarist empire as well as various 
geographical settings. In addition to him, the former members of the Tenyūkyō and 
other nationalist writers were able to write about their own experiences and thoughts, 
which seldom missed an anti-Russian point. The second volume of the Kaihō was so 
full of such comments directed against Russia that the government prohibited the 
journal, which could have worsened diplomatic relations between the countries 
(Uchida 1982: 279).  
As a consequence of the prohibition, the Kokuryūkai published another journal 
called Amur (Kokuryū) that pursued the anti-Russian course of the Kaihō. Uchida and 
his coauthors continued their demands for a more aggressive Japanese foreign policy, 
especially with regard to Russian expansion in the Far East. Again, the government 
                                                
17 With regard to the society’s publications, one is not able to provide an exact number of copies. 
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prohibited the publication of the journal. Consequently it was only published for the 
members of the Kokuryūkai until 1903 (Kokuryūkai 1940: 7). 
But Uchida was unwilling to end his propagandistic campaign against Russia. On 
September 25, 1901, he published his Disquisition of Russia’s Ruin (Roshia bōkokuron) 
(See Uchida and Yoshikura 1901); again, the government intervened and the book was 
forbidden. This time the members of the Kokuryūkai protested against the prohibition 
and the book was allowed to be republished in a more moderate version under the 
title Discourse about Russia (Roshiaron) (See Uchida 1901) in November of the same 
year. 
Despite the more moderate formulations of Uchida’s ideas, the general image of 
Russia remained the same: negative. The leader of the Amur Society demanded the 
expulsion of the Russians from Asia through the use of brute force – meaning a war 
against the tsarist empire. Due to its heavy-handed attacks, the book was banned 
again just some weeks after its republication. In addition to the propaganda crusade in 
written form, the Kokuryūkai prepared the public for war against Russia. During the 
years leading up to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the society 
sponsored and promoted different organizations monetarily so that they would be 
able to run meetings and gatherings of those who were interested in Russia and 
Japanese foreign policy. Uchida and other members of the society gave lectures about 
the Russian problem at such meetings to promote the cause of war.  
Furthermore, the society tried to become prepared for the coming war in several 
ways. The men of the Kokuryūkai were trained in Russian. Some were even sent to the 
Asian mainland to spy in Korea and Manchuria, where they were mapping strategically 
important points or regions and collecting information about the possible enemy’s 
armies. They also bought a small island not far from Seoul, which would be used as an 
ammunition depot during the coming war. All in all, the society propagated the war in 
public by illustrating the reasons for an armed conflict and prepared it in secret by 
arming themselves for the future battle. But of even greater importance is the fact that 
they were at least partially responsible for the creation of a Russian image in Meiji 
Japan.  
 
 
THE RUSSIAN IMAGE AND THE KOKURYŪKAI 
 
Uchida was one of the first Japanese men to travel to East Asia – and not just the 
eastern parts, but even into Western Russia. Due to this, he had gathered many 
impressions that he was later able to publish. Despite the fact that he set out to create 
a rather negative image from the beginning, one has to admit that he was also 
responsible for the creation of a more detailed image of Russia as well. 
No concrete number can be provided regarding this impact, but at the very least, 
the Japanese nationalist spectrum got an image of Russia, which was geographical as 
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well as political. Uchida had mapped a lot of territories during his journeys and was 
one of the few people who were able to provide a detailed image of the tsarist empire 
at all. Due to this situation, one should not underestimate the meaning and 
importance of the publications in the years after the foundation of the Kokuryūkai, 
which provided more detailed insight into Russia’s political and geographical 
circumstances.  
Even if it is impossible to determine who read the journals and publications, 
there must have been at least some attention paid that must have led to the 
governmental prohibitions. Beside the aggressive political demands, a new spatial 
perspective was introduced to the wider public, who could now better imagine how 
big the Russian empire was at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. 
Detailed descriptions of former Tenyūkyō and later Kokuryūkai members’ journeys 
were published by the society’s publishing house, especially in the years after the war, 
so that this effect became also responsible for Russia’s public image after the end of 
her conflict with Japan. Thus the society and its members worked as mediators of 
predominantly geographical information about a mostly unknown spatial sphere, that 
as a result was acknowledged by at least a part of the Japanese public.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Russia was a threat to Japanese ambitions, especially since the Triple-Intervention in 
1895. Many Japanese people felt this to be true even if most people in Japan had no 
concrete image of Russia. This was a natural consequence of the lack of interest in the 
Czarist Empire since the forced opening of Japan in 1853. Since then majority of 
Japanese intellectuals, politicians and militaries were rather interested in Western 
countries. Due to that, almost no Japanese individual spoke Russian and almost no 
one had a spatial consciousness of the Russian Empire. This gap was closed by the 
activities of the Kokuryūkai. Despite the fact that this society was founded to prepare 
for war against Russia, the society’s work and actions had a positive side effect. Maps 
were published along with detailed descriptions of the several journeys that Uchida 
Ryōhei and some of his fellow members had taken. These men wanted to depict the 
coming enemy in detail, but through their endeavors, they provided more general 
information to an increasingly interested public. Some of the first Japanese people 
who were trained in Russian were the members of the Amur Society, who worked as 
translators during the war but were able to provide their services even after the battles 
had ended.  
So all in all, it can be concluded that the role of the Kokuryūkai with regard to the 
propagation of a Russian image is traceable, and the first maps and descriptions 
provided to the greater public were produced by Uchida and his men, who made 
Russia visible for an interested Japan at the beginning of the 20th century. 
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Consequently, one can conclude that without the work of the Kokuryūkai at the 
beginning of this century, the Japanese public would have not known that much 
about the future enemy, especially before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 
1904/05. Finally, however small the advantage of having some specialists on Russia in 
their own rows might have been, the Japanese at least had them, while the Russian 
army lacked highly needed translators and specialists on Japan. For sure, a handful of 
men could not have been able to decide the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, but 
one definitely should not underestimate the effect the small group could have on the 
public image of Russia in general, and on the Japanese military in particular.  
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